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Two Canadian urban areas received travelers with
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) before the
World Health Organization issued its alert. By July 2003,
Vancouver had identified 5 cases (4 imported); Toronto
reported 247 cases (3 imported) and 43 deaths. Baseline
preparedness for pandemic threats may account for the
absence of sustained transmission and fewer cases of
SARS in Vancouver.
I
n Canada, 2 urban areas received returning travelers
infected with severe acute respiratory syndrome–associ-
ated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) from the original Hotel M
cluster in Hong Kong. These travelers returned to Canada
before the World Health Organization (WHO) issued its
first global alert on March 12, 2003. One infected traveler
from Hotel M returned to the greater Toronto area (GTA,
population 4.7 million), Ontario; 2 returned to the
Vancouver census metropolitan area (VCMA, population
2.0 million), British Columbia (BC). GTA, Ontario, is
located in central Canada ≈4,000 km from VCMA, BC,
which is the westernmost province of Canada. Control of
SARS in both GTAand VCMAwas by a national, publicly
funded, but provincially administered healthcare system.
Whereas GTAexperienced sustained transmission, VCMA
did not. Ultimately, GTAreported 247 patients with SARS
and 43 related deaths; 3 cases were imported. VCMAiden-
tified 5 confirmed cases, 4 of which were imported (1–5).
The experience with SARS in Vancouver highlights how a
well-coordinated response of baseline precautions, rein-
forced through timely public health alerts and periodic
infection control audits, can mitigate outbreaks due to
emerging respiratory-borne pathogens. 
The Outbreak
Neutralization antibody titers to SARS-CoV among
patients in VCMA are shown in Table 1. SARS-CoV was
also confirmed in all but patient 1 by reverse transcrip-
tion–polymerase chain reaction with multiple distinct
primer sets applied to multiple specimens (3,6–9). 
Patient 0 and patient 1 were a couple, who stayed on the
14th floor of Hotel M from February 20 to 24, 2003, and
again from March 3 to 6. Both became ill on February 26
(Table 2). They returned to Canada on March 6 and went
directly from the airport to their physician in Vancouver on
March 7 (day 9 of illness). The husband (patient 0) was
sent directly to the emergency room of a tertiary-care hos-
pital (hospital A), arriving at 1:55 p.m. Within 15 minutes,
full respiratory precautions were instituted. He was moved
to a private room in the emergency room at 2:20 p.m. and
transferred to a negative-pressure isolation room (NPIR) at
4:20 p.m. He was admitted into an NPIR of the intensive
care unit (ICU) with full respiratory precautions at 6 a.m.
on March 8 (Table 2).
His wife, patient 1, was recovering from mild illness,
and no further follow-up was arranged. The couple had no
other household contacts. Review confirmed that symp-
toms had not developed in any of the 148 hospital workers
involved in patient 0’s care by 10 days after his arrival at
the hospital. The family physician had no detectable neu-
tralizing antibody to SARS-CoV when tested at day 496.
Patient 2 of the VCMA had prolonged contact abroad
with 2 family members in Hong Kong, who subsequently
died from SARS. Although asymptomatic, she went to her
physician in VCMA on March 26 because she was con-
cerned about her exposure. Chest radiograph showed bilat-
eral consolidation, and she was directed, masked, to
hospital B, where she was admitted directly to an NPIR.
She was transferred to the ICU of hospital C for assisted
ventilation (Table 2). Neither of her 2 household contacts
had detectable SARS-CoV antibody at day 215.
Patient 3 stayed at Amoy Gardens March 28–30 (10).
Upon return, he remained self-isolated in the VCMA in the
basement suite of his home with no contacts (household
members were nevertheless quarantined, but they remained
asymptomatic). Masked and short of breath, he sought
treatment at hospital A on April 3. Initial chest radiograph
was normal, but computed tomography scan showed wide-
spread, patchy, ground-glass opacification of both lungs.
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††Mount Sinai Hospital, Toronto, Ontario, CanadaHe was admitted to hospital D directly to an NPIR (Table
2). His son, who drove him to hospital masked, had no
detectable antibody to SARS-CoV at day 200.
Patient 4 of the VCMA was a nurse who cared for
patient 2 at hospital B from March 29 to 30. At the time,
patient 2 was receiving oxygen by mask and nebulization
therapy. Patient 4 assisted patient 2 in using the toilet,
which was flushed with lid raised in her presence. She fol-
lowed guidelines in place at the time, but these did not
include eye protection. Symptoms developed in the nurse
on April 4. She went to hospital E on April 15, where she
was admitted directly to an NPIR. Her only household
contact remained asymptomatic. Neither he, nor a physi-
cian who examined her on April 11, had detectable SARS
CoV antibody at 200 and 365 days, respectively.
All 5 patients with SARS in VCMArecovered fully. No
additional unrecognized spread was evident. None of 442
staff members of hospitals A–E who participated in a vol-
untary serosurvey had detectable SARS-CoV antibody by
microneutralization assay (details available from corre-
sponding author, upon request).
Conclusions
Mathematical models for SARS, incorporating contact
network theory, stress the importance of patient 0 in pre-
dicting the likelihood of an epidemic (11). This likelihood
can be determined by the transmissibility of the agent,
number of contacts of patient 0, and number of persons
infected between patient 0 (the first patient infected) and
intervention on the index patient (the first recognized case-
patient). From this perspective, the circumstances of
patient 0 in Vancouver compared to patient 0 in the
Toronto, Canada, outbreak, merit closer examination.
Approximately 2,000 passengers land in Vancouver on
direct flights from Hong Kong and mainland China every
day compared with 500 on average to Toronto. As such,
Vancouver is a potential gateway to North America for
emerging pathogens from Asia. Because of this perceived
risk, the BC Centre for Disease Control (BCCDC) had
been increasing preparedness for pandemic threats for sev-
eral years. An electronic distribution system was estab-
lished to regularly disseminate communicable disease
bulletins to healthcare facilities across the province. When
a cluster of unexplained atypical pneumonia in China was
reported almost simultaneously with reemergence of
influenza A H5N1 in Hong Kong, BCCDC used this well-
established communication network to issue an alert on
February 20, 2003. The alert requested enhanced vigilance
for severe influenzalike illness in returning travelers from
mainland China or Hong Kong or among their close con-
tacts. Alerts were repeated February 24, February 28, and
March 12, 2003. Before patient 0’s arrival, the emergency
room at hospital A also participated in an infection control
audit that emphasized that barrier precautions should be
applied with all acute-onset respiratory infections. Patient
0 thus became the index patient in VCMA and was man-
aged cautiously, even before WHO special alerts were
issued. He sought treatment at the cusp of his peak infec-
tious period at a tertiary-care hospital that had been repeat-
edly primed towards precaution. As a returned traveler, he
was a first-generation case. He had no family contacts
other than his wife, with whom he had traveled. Infection
control precautions were implemented almost immediate-
ly upon his arrival at the hospital, limiting opportunities
for spread.
When SARS arose in Ontario, a comparable agency to
BCCDC did not exist. Responsibility for communicable
disease control had shifted over the course of several years
to local health boards, which created a decentralized system
(12). Patient 0 in Toronto also stayed at Hotel M with her
spouse from February 18 to 21. She returned to the GTAon
February 23 to an apartment she shared with 5 family mem-
bers (5,13). She died at home on March 5. During this peri-
od, she infected her 43-year-old son. This son became
Toronto’s index patient, a locally acquired, second-genera-
tion case (5,13). He went to a community hospital on
March 7, the same day as Vancouver’s patient 0, but was
not recognized as a special threat. He was placed in gener-
al observation in the emergency room, where he remained
for 18 hours and where he was given nebulized salbutamol.
He was not placed in airborne isolation until he had been at
the hospital for 21 hours; droplet and contact precautions
were later begun on March 10 (5,13). By the time WHO
issued its global alert, at least 14 persons in GTA had
already become infected through 4 generations of spread:
half within patient 0’s family and the remainder among
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members as they sought treatment at the hospital prompted
an evening  phone consultation on March 13 from an infec-
tion control       practitioner in Toronto to the BCCDC in
Vancouver. This call linked the separate Toronto and
Vancouver cases to events in Asia and led to recognition
that SARS had spread beyond that region. It also prompted
WHO to issue a rare travel advisory on March 15 (14).
Thereafter, awareness of precautions to be taken was
enhanced everywhere, and further importations into
Canada (Vancouver and Toronto) did not result in spread.
Ultimately,  standard droplet and contact precautions
proved an effective barrier to SARS except in the context
of superspreading events such as aerosolizing procedures
(3). Low inherent transmissibility, combined with the
delay in peak infectivity until well into the course of
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nosocomial infection and why so few countries experi-
enced outbreaks (3). Patient 0 tests the baseline capacity of
a   system to respond to emerging threats before they are
known or recognized. While favorable random chance
may have played a role, Vancouver’s response to SARS
should not be dismissed on the basis of luck alone.
Pasteur’s edict that “chance favors only the prepared
mind” may have modern relevance to the prepared health-
care system (15). The response to patient 0 in Vancouver
highlights the importance of central coordination, baseline
preparedness at the local level, and an efficient network of
communication in mitigating outbreaks. Baseline pre-
paredness should include barrier precautions in the care of
all acute-onset respiratory infections. These should be
reinforced through timely public health alerts and periodic
infection control audits.
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